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Abstract  
 
Multinationals are faced with the problem of how to coordinate different actors and 
stop ‘fiefdoms’ emerging that inhibits the achievement of transnational 
cooperation? We identify this as a problem of ‘constitutional ordering’ in the firm. 
Drawing on Varieties of Capitalism approaches, we explore how multinationals 
from different contexts seek to create constitutional orders. We argue that the 
models which exist appear to be destructive of coordination. We explore the 
implications for MNCs  
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To distinguish international management from the broader field of ‘international 
business’, the sub-discipline tend to emphasize not just the focus on ‘management’ 
per se but more particularly the issue of cross-cultural differences and how these 
affect management processes. Tayeb, for example, in her introduction to 
‘International Management: Theories and Practices’ (2003) states that ‘the aim of 
this book is to provide an introduction to the complexities of international 
management by examining how socio-cultural differences, and our understanding 
of these, affect all aspects of management’ (2003:3). The problem with 
international management is that in practice it has tended to rest on a narrow view 
of both management and ‘socio-cultural differences’. The view of management 
espoused in such an approach is, broadly speaking, technical and (surprisingly in 
the light of the concern with cross-cultural differences) lacking in a sense of the 
social construction of management practice. The view of socio-cultural differences 
tends to rest either directly or indirectly on views of ‘national cultures’ as stable, 
homogenous and deterministic (as represented by the works of Hofstede 2000). As 
a result, the nature of ‘international management’ itself as a set of practices is 
reduced to ‘cultural’ management. ‘International management’ constitutes itself as 
a ‘culturalist’ ghetto within the broader field of ‘international business’. Instead, 
we propose that the role of international management as a discipline lies in 
investigating the conditions under which what Barnard (1968) labels as ‘the 
functions of the executive’ are performed in multinational firms. In particular, 
Barnard seeks to investigate how managers create a ‘constitutional order’ which 
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enables actors with different interests to cooperate and collaborate inside the firm. 
Within this perspective, the challenge for the multinational is to “create a 
constitutional order that allows for representation, negotiation, and peaceful 
collaboration among differently constituted organizational entities, each in turn 
constituted by a multitude of professions, guided by their own moral framework 
and distinct national laws” (Kristensen and Zeitlin, 2005: 232).   
 
In this paper, therefore, we seek to reorient the analysis of international 
management away from the dominance of technical and culturalist definitions of 
management towards a framework for understanding the development of 
constitutional orders within multinationals. In order to do this, we place in the 
centre of our analysis institutionalist accounts of different national business 
systems as described, for example in authors such as Amable (2004), Dore, 
Lazonick and O’Sullivan (1999)  Hall and Soskice (2001), Hollingsworth (1997), 
Marsden (1999), Maurice and Sorge (2001), Morgan, Whitley and Moen (2005), 
Streeck and Yamamura (2001), Whitley (1999; 2003b), Whitley and Kristensen 
(1996; 1997) Yamamura and Streeck (2003) , If, as these authors argue, national 
business systems continue to exert a powerful influence over the construction of 
organizations, management and work systems, what do we understand by the term 
‘international management’ and how does this relate to the construction of 
constitutional orders inside multinational firms?  
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What particularly concerns us from the point of view of constitutional orders is 
how management authority is constructed and reproduced. Conceptions of 
authority within firms work together with, and elaborate on, existing forms of 
authority and legitimacy within society as a whole. From an institutionalist 
perspective, forms of authoritative coordination and constitutional ordering within 
firms reflect the dominant rules of the game within particular societies.  The 
distinct problem for the study of ‘international management’ and multinationals is 
therefore  what systems of authority are being built that bridge institutional and 
national differences.  
 
The paper proceeds in the following sections. Firstly, we argue that recent 
developments in the study of multinationals building on the model of the 
‘transnational solution’ (in Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989) have implicitly raised the 
issue of constitutional ordering. However, these discussions have tended to lacks a 
systematic framework for understanding institutional difference and its impact on 
processes of constitutional ordering and authority relations. In the second section 
of the paper, therefore, we provide an outline of such a framework by drawing on 
the national business systems and varieties of capitalism literature. We use this 
framework to identify two distinct socially embedded models of managerial 
authority. In the third section, we then elaborate on the implications of these for 
multinational firms. Our argument is that the central theoretical and practical 
problem in this field is that of developing a legitimate authority structure for a 
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multinational firm. Through our analysis, we show the limitations in the current 
models and discuss possible future directions in research. 
 
THE TRANSNATIONAL SOLUTION AND THE PROBLEM OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERING 
The problem of constitutional ordering in the multinational is of relatively recent 
interest. It reflects the developments stimulated by Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) in 
their discussion of the ‘transnational solution’. Before their book, the relationship 
between a multinational’s headquarters and its subsidiaries was primarily 
conceptualized in terms of the extent to which there was a transfer from the 
headquarters to the subsidiary.  In these discussions, management remained 
primarily domestic and the integration of subsidiaries and headquarters was 
limited. Bartlett and Ghoshal’s ‘transnational solution’ involved a new level of 
dynamic interaction and flows across and around the multinational.  This marked a 
significant shift in the study of international business. Westney, for example, has 
described how ‘the second half of the 1980s marked a turning point in the study of 
the MNE….the focus of managerial interest shifted from the internationalization 
process to the challenges of effectively managing dispersed operations….the 
central themes driving research expanded from the analysis of the competitive 
advantages that enabled a firm to extend its reach internationally to the competitive 
advantages a firm could derive from being international’ (Westney 2003; see also 
Dunning’s reflections on these issues: Dunning 1998; 2001). Bartlett and Ghoshal 
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emphasized that the transnational cannot be reduced to a structural model along the 
lines of a matrix where the tensions between the three core objectives are mediated 
through formal reporting relationships. They state that transnationals ‘decide task 
by task and even decision by decision where issues should be managed. Some 
decisions will tend to be made on a global basis, often at the corporate centre…; 
others will be the appropriate responsibility of local management. But for some 
issues, multiple perspectives are important and shared responsibility is necessary’ 
(Bartlett and Ghoshal 1990: 209). The task of the headquarters is not to impose on 
subsidiaries but to facilitate flows around the firm and to balance between different 
focuses that emerge and ultimately by adjusting resource flows influencing and 
changing the shape of the firm. A hierarchical structure cannot be imposed on this 
diversity which is more like a ‘differentiated and interdependent 
network….integrated with a flexible coordinating mechanism’ (ibid: 210). In 
Hedlund’s terminology, the firm moves from hierarchy to heterarchy (Hedlund 
1986; 1993). 
 
The obvious problem, which then emerges is that of possible conflicts between the 
different actors in the system, now that the constraints of hierarchy have been 
loosened. For us, this is the problem of ‘constitutional ordering’. Such conflicts if 
they take on the shape of competitive rivalry, spurring different subsidiaries and 
branches on towards more efficient and innovative modes of production are seen as 
quite productive and helpful but the problem is that they risk being turned into 
 8    
    
  
wars among “fiefdoms”. Bartlett, Ghoshal and Birkinshaw state that ‘developing 
this capability to create, leverage and apply knowledge worldwide is not a simple 
task for most large MNCs’ (2004: 457). In their original formulation, Bartlett and 
Ghoshal propose that the answer to this lies in a common ‘management mentality’; 
‘such a management mentality becomes the global glue” that counterbalances the 
centrifugal forces of the transnational structure and processes’ (ibid: 175). ‘The 
most crucial task of transnational managers is to encourage a shared commitment 
to integrate the organization at the fundamental level of individual members’ (ibid: 
66). If this is not successfully achieved then ‘the risk was that if participants…were 
not thoroughly indoctrinated in broader organizational objectives, parochial 
attitudes or self-serving behaviours could turn the process negotiations into horse 
trading which produces acceptable compromises and trade-offs rather than shared 
commitments’ (ibid: 169).  
 
Birkinshaw, in his many studies of subsidiaries (Birkinshaw 1997: 2000; 2001; 
Birkinshaw and Hood 1998), reinforces the importance of this problem when he 
notes what he terms the ‘dark side of subsidiary initiatives’ (2000:133). He relates 
this to the problem of empire building and opportunism at subsidiary level. Like 
Bartlett and Ghoshal, however, he holds that the key to controlling this is ‘a strong 
corporate culture’ which enables subsidiaries and HO to trust each other.  Sölvell 
(2003), on the other hand, is more directly critical of the idea of the transnational. 
He argues that differences across subsidiaries are deeply embedded and make 
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cooperation across the MNC highly problematic. Similarly Doz and his colleagues 
find the transnational solution as presented lacks credibility. They state that ‘in our 
research we studied conventional multinational companies and found little 
evidence that they were exploiting their potential for innovation advantage by 
melding dispersed knowledge’ (Doz et al 2003: 161; also Doz et al. 2004).  
Perhaps most importantly in terms of what may be described as internal critiques 
of Bartlett and Ghoshal is that provided by Hedlund in his analysis of the  MNC as 
a Nearly Recomposable system (Hedlund 1999). A nearly recomposable system 
(abbreviated to NRS in the article) ‘generates novelty rather than reproduces the 
old. It puts things together rather than takes them apart’ (ibid: 9). Hedlund uses the 
term in comparison to the idea of ‘nearly decomposable’ system, where the system 
has been designed to control possible ‘contagion’ across parts and enable the 
elements to be taken apart easily and without affecting the overall system. In the 
decomposable system, it is the integrity of the elements that is crucial. In the NRS 
it is the interaction of the parts that generates novelty and innovation. NRSs are 
characteristic of many different sorts of social systems, not just firms. However, 
particular sorts of MNCs (corresponding most obviously to Bartlett and Ghoshal’s 
model of the transnational) seem ‘rich in recomposition opportunities’ (ibid: 22). 
Nevertheless, Hedlund sees a major problem in achieving this potential. He states 
that ‘the drawbacks – at least empirically to judge from the research there is – 
pertain mostly to questions of identity and attitude. Few MNCs can boast a 
coherent and shared identity and sense of belonging among the employees globally 
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or a forceful vision for knowledge and development. Openness to the outside as 
well as an experimental attitude are hampered by the historical weight of 
successfully exploiting old advantages. However, there are also “harder” obstacles, 
generated primarily by structural rigidities at the firm as well as the industry or 
larger levels. To the former belong the often pathological reward systems – if you 
want international recomposition – and lack of sharing of knowledge across 
organizational boundaries. At the meso and macro levels, the fact of thousands of 
languages being spoken in the world and of differing standards prohibiting shifts 
between contexts are formidable barriers’ (ibid: 23). Like the other authors 
previously discussed, therefore, Hedlund finds the idea of learning across national 
borders a crucial part of the MNC but similarly finds there are significant barriers 
to this. In terms of solutions, he offers a similar answer – around the theme of 
management and the creation of a common vision or common culture that 
overcome the differences in the heterarchy.  
These debates indicate the crucial problems for international management and 
multinational firms. For us, what these authors are identifying is the problem of 
developing a constitutional order in a multinational. In order to tackle this 
question, however, it is necessary to consider what are the foundations of 
constitutional orders in firms per se. Our argument is that such orders have in the 
past been primarily constructed within different varieties of capitalism. As a 
multinational spans different varieties of capitalism (see Morgan, Kristensen and 
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Whitley for various theoretical and empirical analyses of this problem) , therefore, 
it is first essential to understand those different constitutional orders.  
 
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERS 
Drawing on what we will call, for the  sake of simplicity the ‘varieties of 
capitalism’ (VoC) perspective, we identify in this section two different forms of 
constitutional ordering within firms. This framework has been explored in a 
multitude of recent papers and books (e.g. Hall and Soskice 2001; Maurice and 
Sorge 2001; Morgan et al. 2005; Streeck and Yamamura 2001; 2003; Whitley 
1999; Whitley and Kristensen 1996). This literature suggests that in particular 
national institutional contexts, there will be dominant rules of the game which 
structure the nature of economic actors, the roles which they play and the 
conditions under which they interact. National institutional settings (i.e. particular 
configurations of relations and interactions within and between the state, the 
financial system, the system of education and training and the cultural system) 
shape the types of firms which develop inside them by influencing patterns of 
ownership and control and patterns of authority and the sharing of authority 
between managers, employees and business partners. These rules of the game 
underpin the constitutional order inside the firm, i.e. the structures, processes and 
beliefs which enable actors to make sense of their world and how to act in it. 
Constitutional orders are not static, but evolve in a path dependent manner in 
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response to exogenous and endogenous change processes. Constitutional orders are 
open to challenge but tend to be characterised by relative stability over periods of 
time. 
In order to illustrate our argument, we draw on the well-established distinction in 
the VoC literature between liberal market economies (abbreviated to LMEs)  and 
coordinated market economies (CMEs) (see in particular Hall and Soskice 2001). 
Whilst we recognise that in reality, there are varieties within these broad 
categories, for purposes of illustration, this dichotomous distinction enables us to 
marshal our key points and develop them within existing space limitations.  
Coordinated market economies (e.g. Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Japan) are 
characterised by a constitutional ordering at the level of the firm and the economy 
in which authority is shared and distributed amongst collectively organized 
stakeholders, amongst e.g. business partners, professions, crafts, standard-setting 
bodies, vocational institutions and other institutions outside the individual firm. 
Such systems (whilst they differ in some important respects), share a similar 
emphasis on the importance of knowledge and skills and a recognition that these 
are distributed amongst different groups (see Streeck and Yamamura 2001 and 
Yamaura and Streeck 2003 for a detailed account of these processes in Germany 
and Japan). Achieving the objectives of the firm requires cooperation across these 
different stakeholders and this is secured not by market mechanisms but by 
institutional mechanisms that provide the framework for coordination, e.g. works 
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councils, employee directors, collective agreements, ‘friendly’ shareholders, 
closely integrated supplier networks etc..  
Liberal market economies such as the US and the UK rely on the market. Once the 
resources (labour, capital etc.) are purchased on the market, they are coordinated 
within strict managerial hierarchies. Authority is concentrated in this hierarchy and 
the majority of the employees (and business partners) are excluded from 
participation in decision-making either at the workplace or at the strategic level. 
We label the first a consensual skill based system of authority and the latter a 
bureaucratic positional based system of authority (see also Whitley 2003a).  
Bureaucratic positional based systems of authority are associated with the classic 
Chandlerian model of managerial hierarchies. The change from the authority of the 
heroic individual entrepreneur towards bureaucracy in American capitalism 
involved Scientific Management and the training of engineers on a mass-scale to 
take over the new positions of industrial bureaucracies, while simultaneously 
reducing the needs of skills at the operational end of the scale (Bendix, 1956:ch 5; 
Noble,1977). Later this tendency has been prolonged by increasing on a mass-
scale, administrative education and occupations, primarily in business economics, 
etc. thus further differentiating the managerial group from other employees. There 
is minimal authority sharing with lower level employees. The managerial layer 
devises principles and procedures of practice which are imposed on employees 
with limited consultation. Thus the constitutional order of firms in these systems is 
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constructed around the dominance of the managerial hierarchy. Other employees 
are kept at arms-length from key decisions as are other outsiders such as suppliers. 
Coordination is based on a combination of external controls on and monitoring of  
behaviour, coupled with market-based bargaining over conditions of work in which 
the collective organization of employees may play a limited role. 
Consensual skill based systems of authority rely on all the different groups in the 
firm having substantial training and through this expertise in their particular area. 
These groups are embedded within a system of shared authority with employer 
groups and the state as well as other occupational groups whereby rights and duties 
are associated with a particular sphere of jurisdiction. Markets are constrained by 
this system in that particular roles within the firm and outside can only be 
undertaken by individuals belonging to such groups (Stinchcombe 1992). In such 
systems craft unions and/or professions compete against each other in an effort to 
enlarge the skill base and the jurisdiction of their members especially when new 
technologies or new forms of work organization are emerging. Firms and 
employees organized in these sorts of way are constantly negotiating over the 
distribution of authority in these changing contexts. In practise this means that 
managers need to enlarge their skills at the operational level so that they can 
continuously reproduce the ability to instruct and give advice to still more skilled 
subordinates. It is on this ability that their authority rest (Stewart et al, 1994),. 
They need to continually improve on their ability to lead the “citizens” of the firm 
not by reference to abstract knowledge of ‘business’ or ‘marketing’ or ‘accounting’ 
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but by reference to the same body of knowledge that is possessed by the 
employees. In such contexts, managers often arrive in this position via circuitous 
routes but the main thing is that they become managers through learning technical 
skills first and then adding to these other skills e.g. in finance, marketing, sales etc. 
mainly as a result of experience.  
This affects how managers interact with employees as a whole and how different 
groups of employees interact with each other. Processes of rivalry, competition and 
conflict are framed within a constitutional order that is based on a system of self-
confidence and self–respect at the level of the various groups. This also exists 
within a system of mutual respect as each group has its own area of expertise and 
recognises, even whilst engaged in rivalry, the expertise of the others. Management 
too is part of this, not as a separate and superior group but as a key mechanism in 
helping groups recognize their interdependence and finding ways that facilitate 
collaboration amongst potentially competing groups of employees. Management in 
such a system is based on experience of handling actors in such a way that “zones 
of indifference” are respected (Barnard, 1968). In such a context, central control is 
limited and the goal is to ensure that mutual commitments across groups of 
employees can be facilitated when the challenge of change emerges.  
In the bureaucratic positional based system of authority, it is the managerial 
hierarchy which decides how change takes place. At one extreme, the bureaucracy 
may simply fire its workers and hire a new crew with new skills, subordinating 
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these to the standardized rules of its bureaucratic administration. Alternatively it 
may seek to make the change by acquiring a new site or plant which better meets 
its new objectives or it may impose a new set of rules and controls on the 
workforce. Finally it may change through establishing an innovation centre, the 
successful products of which are then planned into production by engineers, 
imposing their distinctive plan. If the managerial hierarchy cannot do the task, the 
capital market effectively intervenes and forces such changes. Moreover, it is in 
the capital market that the real possibilities for change arise as relatively open and 
flexible access to financing in liberal market economies reduces the barriers to 
risk-taking and opens up the possibility of new combinations of capital, labour and 
technology. Institutional authority, i.e. the socially legitimated right to make 
decisions about the strategy and structure of the firm, rests in the managerial 
hierarchy, no matter how much particular decisions may be contested. Moreover, 
the scale of the changes can be described as ‘configurational’, i.e. they can 
fundamentally alter the structure and strategy of the firm.  
In the consensual skill based system of authority, change is much more difficult as 
its negotiation evokes not only the actors within the firm as such, but also the 
actors in the wider society, including banks, trade unions, other firms (suppliers, 
customers and competitors), local and national government, educational and 
training institutions etc.. In the consensual based system, managers cannot assume 
that they can achieve new goals simply through a process of imposition. The fact 
that many of the managers have been recruited from the ranks of the skilled 
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employees is crucial to managing this process of coordination. Managers derive 
their authority from their personal position and reputation established through their 
long experience and involvement at various levels of skill and rank within the 
occupation and the firm. This gives them the authority as well as the knowledge 
and understanding to negotiate and facilitate change processes within the firm, 
using their contacts and networks in the wider local context to reinforce this 
process. This is not to say that resistance and conflict does not occur in such a 
context but it occurs within an institutionalised framework where authority is 
legitimated through the system of skill and knowledge acquisition rather than 
simply bureaucratic position, constitutional bodies for negotiations and exchange 
of different professional views are in place and can be rejuvenated to modernize 
the ability to reconcile novel interest conflicts. Such systems work best in terms of 
allowing intensive, incremental cooperations to occur that gradually improve 
products and processes. Management’s role is concerned with ensuring that the 
necessary network linkages that will facilitate this are sustained and developed. 
This is best achieved through the involvement of managers who have participated 
over the long-term on a personal basis in this process and therefore work with an 
established knowledge base and reputation within the local area. In this context, 
the constitutional ordering limits the scale of change, making it difficult to 
introduce configurational change but easier to produce incremental improvements. 
                   ----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
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AUTHORITY AND MANAGEMENT IN THE TRANSNATIONAL FIRM 
Transnationals as defined by Bartlett and Ghoshal aim to manage within one 
organizational setting the advantages from both these sorts of systems. On the one 
hand, they seek to be able to introduce configurational change, shifting production 
from one site to another as economic conditions change, or shifting investment 
from one set of products to another. On the other hand, they seek to enhance 
innovation and improvement in and across the organization by extending learning 
and cooperation within and between sites. What are the implications of this? We 
proceed in three stages. Firstly we consider multinationals whose home base is in 
liberal market economies and examine how their existing constitutional ordering 
produces a form of that impacts on local subsidiaries in distinctive ways. Secondly 
we consider multinationals whose home base is coordinated market economies. We 
argue that such multinationals find it very difficult to establish similar 
constitutional orderings to those which they are used to at home in overseas 
settings. We therefore conclude that there are fundamental structural obstacles to 
the achievement of the transnational model within the current frameworks. In our 
final discussion and conclusion section, we examine the implications of this 
argument for the study of international management. We draw on a range of 
empirical studies of MNCs in LME and CME contexts for our argument (e.g. 
Belanger, Berggren, Bjorkman and Kohler 1999; Edwards, Armstrong, Marginson 
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and Purcell 1996; Ferner 2000; Ferner and Qunitanilla 1998; Ferner and Varul 
2000; Ferner et al. 2004,  Geppert, Matten and Williams 2002, 2003; Geppert, 
Williams and Matten 2003; Kristensen and Zeitlin 2005; Lane 1998; 2001)   
Authority, Governance and constitutional ordering in Multinationals from 
liberal market economies 
In liberal market economies, it is legitimate and expected that shareholder value 
will drive senior management’s considerations about investments, costs, products 
and processes (Aguilera and Jackson 2003: Froud, Haslem, Johal and Williams 
2000; Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000; Williams 2000). The main goal is to achieve 
an acceptable profit for shareholders. Shareholders in such systems are now 
predominantly institutional investors which actively monitor share prices and are 
involved in frequent transactions of buying and selling in order to maximize 
returns to their clients as part of their competitive strategy. Failure of firms to 
satisfy these requirements is reflected in falling stock prices, which in turn 
increases the cost of borrowing to management. Across firms as a whole, 
differential performance gaps are the basis for the market for corporate control as 
firms with positive share price growth are able to bid for lower performing firms 
through combinations of share swaps, borrowings and cash. Whilst there are many 
ways to achieve shareholder value (and investors are not necessarily concerned 
about the exact mechanisms), there are a relatively small number of key 
performance indicators which show whether the company is on the appropriate 
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track. These indicators basically relate to returns on investment for the 
shareholders. Depending on the speed and direction in which trends on returns 
move, companies (and their managements) will find themselves either vulnerable 
(to takeover or, in an increasing number of cases, to replacement as a result of 
well-publicised ‘shareholder revolts’) or powerful (flush with the capital to take 
over other companies or to return cash to shareholders if no takeover situations 
appear likely to generate a good level of return). In terms of legitimacy, senior 
managers in liberal market economies achieve this through their ability to respond 
quickly and effectively to financial market pressures by utilising the managerial 
hierarchy to implement change (see e.g. the discussion of corporate restructuring in 
Lazonick 2004 ). These systems encourage ‘reconfigurational’ processes, i.e. 
merger and acquisition activity or bursts of foundings of new firms as in the 
dot.com boom, in which managerial hierarchies respond quickly and rapidly to 
changing market circumstances.  
These changes have meant senior management of multinationals from these 
systems have become more interventionist in local sites in a number of ways. Such 
interventionism was a taken-for-granted capability of the authority structure in 
these systems. It did not need to be justified or debated as it was embedded in the 
concept of what it was to be a senior manager in a firm whether it was 
mulotinational or not. The result was the introduction of  new and more elaborated 
systems of performance controls on subsidiaries. In the financial area, these 
controls and targets stemmed from more sophisticated business planning 
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techniques in head offices facilitated by a growing professionalisation of strategic 
management and more powerful IT mechanisms for identifying performance at any 
particular moment. The identification of shareholder value returns led to a focus on 
how each part of the business could contribute to this and an increasing pressure to 
reduce costs and improve performance. Such goals have been common in these 
systems for a long time but what gives them importance in this period is the ability 
to turn general exhortations into particular targets and to monitor performance to 
targets extremely tightly and frequently. Associated with this in multinationals was 
the effort to ‘learn’ from diversity in a very particular way. This was through the 
use of benchmarks. Thus the performance of the different sites of the MNC (across 
a variety of non-financial as well as financial targets, e.g. productivity levels, 
manpower levels, employment costs, down-times, speed of set-ups etc.) were 
subjected to comparative analysis. Building from this, targets could be set for 
different sites to meet the ‘world’ best standard established by another site within 
the firm. These mechanisms are part of the broader effort of the senior 
management to create a sort of internal market competition within the firm 
reflected both in ongoing benchmarking that fed into decisions on relocation and 
corporate restructurings and into specific ‘competitions’ over the allocation of 
resources within the broader multinational. Birkinshaw (1999), for example, 
describes this in terms of competition not just for new investment but for becoming 
a centre of excellence in a particular area of production that brings with it status, 
position, rewards and opportunities for individual mobility.  
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One perspective on these processes is that they do work like a market and that the 
result is an enhancement of the overall efficiency of the organization. We wish to 
counter this by emphasising the ‘politics’ of this process. In other words, our 
expectation is that such competitive processes also unleash responses in social 
actors in different contexts. Social actors have interests that are not circumscribed 
by the strategic framework of the multinational. Their concerns are likely to 
involve their own survival and prosperity, whether as individuals or collectives. 
For them, the particular organization in which they work significantly frames their 
life chances and how they can seek to improve them. However, this is as much 
about informal mechanisms of power as it is about succumbing to the formal rules 
of the system (Edwards et al. 1996). It is important therefore to identify how the 
game which the multinational from the liberal market economy constructs becomes 
enacted on an informal and a formal level within subsidiaries.  
We would identify three general tendencies (which are played out in different ways 
in different contexts). Firstly these processes create a form of transparency that is 
likely to stimulate competition between sites making it less likely in many cases 
that there will be voluntary cooperation and sharing. Secondly, they create new 
forms of ‘gaming’ over information delivered to the head office as subsidiary 
managers seek to portray themselves in the best light by a judicious process of 
editing and censorship. Thirdly, benchmarking processes will also therefore 
become sites where access to and power over information, categories of data and 
interpretation of results is thoroughly imbued with considerations of broader 
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organizational politics. How this works out in practice, however, is likely to vary 
between subsidiaries located in liberal market economies and those located in 
coordinated market economies.   
Impact on subsidiaries and subsidiary managers in liberal market 
economies. If we consider the effects of these processes it is obvious that they are 
more easily dealt with from subsidiaries based in liberal market economies with a 
bureaucratic positional based system of authority. The more these subsidiaries have 
become professionalized bureaucracies, the better they will be able to respond to 
the numbers game of ROI, measure new bench-marks in standardized ways, etc. as 
they are exactly constructed in order to facilitate the efficient flow of such types of 
information. Authority and the nature and role of managers constitutes a central 
issue here. Managers in liberal market economies identify themselves with the 
goals of the organization. Their career has two elements to it. On the one hand, as 
part of the management hierarchy in such firms, they are dependent on achieving 
the goals as set out by senior managers. Failure to do so undermines their raison 
d’etre and is likely to lead to them leaving the organization under conditions not of 
their own choosing. On the other hand, as ‘general’ managers, they are not tied into 
the firm but can become active on the external labour market in the right 
circumstances of their own choosing. This implies that subsidiary managers in 
liberal market economies are likely to identify more strongly with the management 
role in the firm as a whole than with any local social actors. Whether they are 
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expatriate managers or not, subsidiary managers are part of the authority structure 
of the managerial hierarchy of the firm as a whole.  
In terms of the ‘gaming’ behaviour to which we earlier referred, this has particular 
implications. It points to a combination amongst subsidiaries in liberal market 
economies of what has been called the ‘boy scout’ model of subsidiary (following 
orders like a good boy) and an entrepreneurial strategy (trying to find new business 
areas) (Delany, 1998). The subsidiary manager has little interest in the particular 
social and institutional context of the site. They are willing participants in HQ 
strategies of bench-marking, investment-bargaining and regime shopping (Mueller 
and Purcell, 1992; Mueller, 1996) even where this is likely to lead to the closure of 
their own site. This is not to say that subsidiary managers do not use their position 
to shape and bend information to their own interests. On the contrary because of 
the rapidity of mobility in such firms and the frequent restructurings that occur 
(thus creating new management positions as well as forcing others out onto the 
external labour market), it is very much in these managers’ interests to ‘over-
conform’ to senior management controls. The long term viability of their actions is 
rarely going to be calculable in a context of multiple restructurings. On the other 
hand  its short-term impact will be highly visible. Therefore there is a premium on 
over-conformity to immediate head office demands. As a consequence, it is 
difficult for these subsidiaries to be other than highly dependent on the head office. 
This in turn makes them very vulnerable to the reconfigurations and restructurings 
that senior managers engage in in order to placate shareholders. 
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Impact on subsidiaries and subsidiary managers in coordinated 
market economies. In consensual skill based systems of authority, however, 
shared authority means that novel measures, bench marks, etc. are going to take 
time to implement as they often involve a re-negotiation of jurisdictions and 
responsibilities. In practise, head office managers from multinationals based in a 
liberal market economy are unlikely to allow this time.  In effect the pressure is on 
managers to violate the “zones of indifference” which are the basis of the mutual 
respect, which sustains this system. The more managers pass this pressure onto 
their employees the more risk there is that changes in the consensual skill based 
systems of authority will occur and irreparably damage the previous model. The 
more they pass on this pressure to their suppliers in the local context, again, the 
more they undermine the cooperation on which the system is based. In reality, 
however, this is unlikely to happen precisely because of the existing authority 
system in these systems. Unlike liberal market economies, where managers draw 
their authority from being members of the managerial hierarchy, in these systems, 
management authority derives from local skills and knowledge Local managers 
with strong reputations in the local system and high authority amongst employees 
will therefore evolve ways of protecting the local. This may be achieved in a 
number of ways. One way is that local managers will engage in more strategic 
game playing in the local context to deepen the broader coalition and network of 
interests that supports the local site. This can have a positive outcome for the head 
quarters of the MNC in the sense that the local site continues to upgrade its 
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innovative capacities and potential without waiting for the permission of the 
headquarters. Another way to protect the local is to engage with the headquarters 
in terms of shaping information and expectations more actively so that, for 
example, the terms, the results and the interpretation of bench-marking exercises 
are more negotiated than might be expected. Of course, the ability to achieve these 
‘positive’ outcomes at the local level is highly contingent on a variety of 
circumstances, ranging from the skills and commitment of local managers through 
to the broader economic and shareholder pressures under which headquarters 
labours. 
It may be objected that this argument ignores the power and ability of the head 
office to insert expatriate managers into the local context and in this way ensure 
that their goals are more unproblematically achieved. This, however, has obvious 
dangers. As such expatriates lack legitimacy and knowledge in the local context, 
they have basically two options. The first is to do as they are told by headquarters 
(e.g. in terms of implementing benchmarks, cutting costs etc.) risking creating 
opposition in the local context and destroying the existing capabilities of the 
subsidiary. This may well be the most obvious way to act as, again, the longer term 
consequences of such actions may only emerge long after the expatriate has moved 
on to another position either inside or outside the MNC. The second is to ‘go 
native’ and rely on locals to resolve the practical problems – in which case once 
again, the issue arises concerning the speed and nature of change in coordinated 
market systems.  
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Thus the managers in these local sites often have long careers and commitments at 
local level, especially if they have gained their position through the normal 
working careers of a skill based system of authority. Therefore they know better 
than to commit themselves too strongly to head office policies which may have 
limited duration as the managers (either in HQ or as expatriates) promoting them 
will probably have moved on within a few years having been replaced with others 
using a new set of tools and techniques to achieve shareholder value (and enhance 
their own personal career in this elite labour market of senior executives of 
MNCs). To them, therefore, it may look much more promising to work for a career 
locally, by maintaining the codes of conduct that leads to promotion within the 
status-hierarchy of the profession. Local managers and employees in subsidiaries 
in consensually based skill systems are therefore likely to reject or subvert a 
narrative of authority based on managerial hierarchy and shareholder value.  
What arises in these contexts is clearly a range of local conflicts and tensions, 
partly within the local site (between those seeking to implement outside controls 
and those unwilling to accept the new capital market narrative as an adequate 
replacement for narratives of involvement and participation based on skill and 
expertise) and partly between the local site and the head office (as actors struggle 
over the presentation and narrative interpretation of events and processes as 
preludes to action) (see Kristensen and Zeitlin 2005 for a detailed study of these 
tensions and conflicts in one MNC).  Depending on the depth of these conflicts and 
processes, local sites can respond in a variety of ways. One potential response is 
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where local sites manage to construct a new solidaristic narrative of their own 
identity which envisages the creation of a possible future outside that of the 
multinational in which it is currently embedded. Thus the continued efforts at 
control from head office actually become counter-productive as they stimulate 
growing questioning of the legitimacy of these activities and a reawakened interest 
and understanding of the distinctiveness of the local site. In particular if such a 
local site is surrounded by strong institutions that define rights and duties 
(authority and discipline) differently from how the multinational headquarters 
does, it may increase the propensity of the subsidiary to follow a subversive 
strategy (Delany, 1998) towards the HQ. Such a strategy which may be based on 
enabling the different groups in the local area to see their joint long term interests 
as involving cooperation and coordination over objectives set within their own 
network rather than within the managerial hierarchy of the firm. This, of course, 
depends upon some existing form of solidarity amongst employees and managers 
in the local site, supported by local labour market institutions, collaborative 
traditions and surrounding enterprises that provide for alternative business 
relations. These institutions may be formal (local government, local trade unions, 
local firm associations) or they may be informal (strong local labour markets that 
offer employees alternatives; local innovation systems that encourage managers to 
deepen their attachment to the locality rather than weaken it (Solvell and Zander 
1997). Not all sites even within coordinated market economies have these powers 
and they may find head office measures imposed on them, in the process 
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extinguishing whatever sparks of local advantage might exist until they simply 
become another subsidiary without anything distinctive for the MNC to learn. In 
both these cases, the MNC might end up destroying the diversity and difference 
which is supposed to be the transnational advantage.  
Authority and Governance in Multinationals from coordinated market 
economies 
Traditionally in such economies, the emphasis was on ‘patient capital’. Ownership 
was generally vested in companies that were closely integrated with the firm itself. 
Thus shares would be held by banks and insurance companies which were as 
interested in gaining banking and insurance business as they were in making a 
profit on shares. Similarly in coordinated market systems, shares were often held 
by business partners as a sign of long-term cooperation and trust. In these contexts, 
legitimacy and authority was gained by guiding the firm long-term in the 
development of its products and processes. Shareownership tends to be more 
highly concentrated and the largest blockholders of shares are represented on the 
board of directors. Thus there is more information and knowledge in the hands of 
the key shareholders who are in turn more likely to be closely involved in 
approving and supporting senior management’s plans. This system of governance 
and the consensual skill based system of authority complement each other as both 
tend to evolve through multilayered negotiations between interested parties. Top 
executives would make agreements with external members through the boards of 
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directors and these could be linked to agreements among groupings of employees 
in, for example, works councils. By linking these agreements, external and internal 
stakeholders would be mutually bound together. Such systems could be said to 
possess from the outset constitutive elements for procedures to re-negotiate 
specializations and investments at many layers of the corporation so that they 
could create an experimental practise of re-composition and mutual learning. 
Reflecting this, firms from such systems were actually loath to become involved in 
international production. Their whole system was based on a deeply socially 
embedded model of organization with network links across firms, stakeholders, 
and local and national institutions. It was out of these networks that the distinctive 
innovative and competitive capabilities of these firms emerged. Therefore firms 
from these systems tended to prefer an export model of internationalisation since 
this did not face them either with the problem of managing under more 
bureaucratic managerial hierarchy type conditions or with the difficulty of trying to 
establish similar networks as in their home base in institutional conditions which 
were not conducive to the same patterns of collaboration and cooperation. For 
these reasons, they tend to find it more difficult to internationalize than do firms 
from liberal market economies. In recent decades, however, a combination of 
political pressures (threatened tariff barriers to close markets against ‘unfair 
imports’) and economic circumstances (to achieve global economies of scale and 
scope, to access local market information, to take advantage of different cost 
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structures) have led the largest firms in coordinated market economies to develop 
on an international basis. 
However, what is the significance of this in terms of such companies establishing a 
transnational structure or international management? Whitley has been extremely 
sceptical of these developments (2001: 2005). In a recent paper, for example, he 
suggests that multinationals from these types of system are best described as either 
‘colonial’ or ‘domestically dominated’ rather than ‘transnational’ in the sense 
described by Bartlett and Ghoshal. Whitley’s ‘colonial’ model of the MNC is 
described as a national company with foreign operations that are highly subservient 
to the head office (Whitley 2005: 259).What he describes as ‘domestically 
dominated firms’ show some opening up but still retain key decisions and key 
innovation capabilities in the home base. Unlike MNCs from liberal market 
economies, they are less concerned to internationalise in order to learn from 
overseas contexts as they alredy have strong learning capabilities in their home 
contexts. Their main concerns are market access and economies of scale.  
Japanese MNCs, in particular, seem to continue to resist the ‘transnational’ model, 
preferring in Bartlett and Ghoshal’s terms to be ‘global’, i.e. delivering to a global 
market through pipelines in different contexts (Beechler and Bird 1999; Campbell 
and Burton 2003; Morgan et al. 2003; Whitley et al 2003). In this way, they have 
avoided a whole set of problems concerned with ensuring learning and transfer of 
knowledge across subsidiaries. Having implanted certain key characteristics of the 
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Japanese production system in subsidiaries, they leave them to be managed by 
local managers in ways consonant with the local context. Indeed liberal market 
contexts for their investment are preferable as fitting in to the local context is 
relatively simple and does not require adjustment to complex regulations or 
socially embedded institutions. Thus within Japanese MNCs, ‘colonial’ 
subsidiaries are, as the term suggests, relatively powerless in the overall context of 
the firm. The local managers of subsidiaries are locked into their particular part of 
the multinational with very little influence over broader strategic decisions.  
German companies, on the other hand, are somewhat different, being less 
‘colonialist’ and more ‘domestically dominated’ in Whitley’s terms. Unlike 
Japanese firms, they have increasingly grown internationally through merger and 
takeover (Wortmann 2000: 2001), often as a deliberate attempt to create both 
economies of scale and the sort of diversity, variety and learning opportunities 
articulated in the ‘transnational’ model. Clearly, this relates to the more rapid 
changes in ownership and governance that are occurring in Germany (compared to 
Japan) (see e.g. the contributions in Yamamura and Streeck 2003; also Geppert et 
al. 2002, 2003: Lane1998: 2001). The opening up of financial markets has led to a 
growing internationalization of the ownership of German firms as blockholders 
(particularly the major banks and insurance companies) themselves have been 
encouraged (both by government and taxation reform and their own desire to 
establish a global presence) to sell off their shares. Similarly, the firms themselves 
have sought to internationalize their shareholders as a means of accessing capital in 
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new ways (particularly through the US bond markets) and thus facilitating overseas 
acquisitions. This has left the German MNCs struggling to balance off their 
commitment to consensual authority systems within Germany with the 
opportunities open to them in other contexts to develop more market oriented 
relationships. As a number of authors have shown this leads to increased pressure 
within Germany for the system to change, the result currently being a delicate 
balance of forces (see in particular the discussions in Yamamura and Streeck 2003; 
also Morgan et al. 2005). However, German managers remain sensitive to the role 
of skill based authority systems (both in Germany and elsewhere) in terms of 
achieving long-term incremental change and improvement. Studies of German 
MNCs have shown that budgets, targets and benchmarks tend to be treated more as 
ways of negotiating improved performance in local sites rather than as disciplinary 
mechanisms (Ferner and Quintanilla 1998: Ferner and Varul 2000). The continued 
significance of ‘patient capital’ facilitates this process as it provides a barrier 
against frequent reconfigurations and also encourages the long-term focus of senior 
managers who themselves identify strongly with the firm. 
How do subsidiaries from different contexts respond to these processes in MNCs 
based in coordinated market economies? Subsidiaries in liberal market economies 
are likely to interpret this in terms of their dominant view of authority, i.e. to 
construct possible head office attempts to facilitate cooperation and change as 
directives, translating them into specific targets and implementing them as such. 
To shift such local subsidiaries away from this appears extremely difficult 
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particularly where it is obvious that the weight of authority, control and innovation 
remains in the HQ in the coordinated market economy. Subsidiaries in the home 
base or in other coordinated market economies, on the other hand, may understand 
the general game which they are being asked to play but may respond by 
enhancing their locally produced networks as a defence against becoming over-
dependent on the MNC (see Kristensen and Zeitlin 2005). 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The differing authority structures which we have identified create fundamental 
problems for multinationals in establishing a constitutional order. The problem for 
the head office in the circumstances outlined is that in seeking to exert power and 
failing to be effective in many contexts, it actually weakens itself even further. If it 
cannot achieve its stated objectives, it undermines even a utilitarian view of its 
legitimacy. Such a view from the inside of the MNC would emphasize that its 
usefulness to local sites derives from two sources. Firstly it provides some 
protection from the vicissitudes of independent ownership (whether that was on the 
stock market or by individual control). Secondly, through its global reach, it offers 
local sites conduits into new markets across the world that they might not be able 
to reach as independent, smaller firms. However, the conflicts, difficulties and 
changes set up inside the transnational form make even these objectives difficult to 
achieve, thus reinforcing local sites’ concerns to re-establish their own narrative of 
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authority. The enigma then becomes how the MNC is able to maintain any 
authority  when it seems to destroy it by exercising it.  
In our view, this reflects two possible directions for MNCs in the future related to 
two models of constitutional ordering. The first model we can label as a 
manipulative, pathological model of constitutional ordering; the second is a 
positive cooperative model. The first model is easier to observe and describe. 
Firstly it involves the senior managers utilizing their ability  to impose on others 
uncertainty, (as also demonstrated by Crozier (1964) for the special case of the 
Post War French industrial bureaucracy), and secondly, they use their position to 
allocate ‘blame’, as analyzed by Jackall (1988) in case of the multidivisional form.   
As the transnational solution is a non-structural solution to the problems that face 
firms in terms of integration and diversity it offers a deep reservoir of possibilities 
for both generating uncertainty and allocating blame. The transnational solution is 
propounded by Bartlett and Ghoshal as a philosophy and a mind-matrix that 
enables managers to accept and to live in ambiguity. In their analysis of successful 
cases they show how successful top executives rather than sticking to one 
organizational structure shift between different structures to balance between 
ambiguous signals from the environment. This legitimizes top-executives 
constantly changing the formal structures and jurisdictions within a multinational 
as a means to ensure profitability. However, by doing so they create a permanent 
state of uncertainty for sub-levels of the corporation in which it is very difficult to 
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strategize coherently and consistently – either as ‘boy-scouts’ or as ‘subversive 
strategists’. At the same time it makes it nearly impossible to stabilize the system 
that in any possible way can trace responsibility and compare performance in the 
longer run because corporate restructurings are so frequent and widespread. In this 
melee of uncertainty, what makes the difference for individual managers in the 
headquarters is to demonstrate fast, short term improvements in performance and 
at the same time to escape from being “blamed” for failures. So, as Jackall 
expresses it, bureaucratic power becomes the right to allocate blame to 
subordinates. Subordinates’ best way of escaping from this is to accept the 
performance-measures that they can most easily achieve in the short term and thus 
gain for themselves so fast a promotion that they avoid the blame process. Better 
still they may become allocators of blame disciplining their successors for the 
mistakes that they have made themselves.  In local sites, where local narratives are 
also a method of constructing track-records and allocating responsibility in a very 
different way, this process clearly does not increase the legitimacy of the HQ and 
its promotional system. What it does do is to teach local managers how to play a 
new game. The problem is that this form of constitutional ordering negates the 
supposed advantages of the transnational firm because its focus of concentration is 
not on enabling learning to occur across diverse contexts but rather of imposing 
uniformity on contexts and thereby destroying the potential to learn. 
So what is the alterantive constitutional ordering? Firstly, it is clear that an 
uncontrolled penetration of shareholder value into transnationals is 
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counterproductive and will end up destroying diversity and learning potentials. 
What might ameliorate this trend? This is a huge question reflecting issues of 
public policy and economic management that cannot be adequately addressed in 
this paper. However we would point to the way in which certain forms of 
institutional activism are building into their policies and practices a stronger 
awareness of the social consequences of investment. Another more contentious 
argument would be that if MNCs are really as we suggest, i.e. destroying their 
supposed advantages rather than developing them, then this will become visible in 
financial markets, e.g. on the analogy of the ‘conglomerate discount’ (i.e. the stock 
value of a conglomerate is often below the value of its parts if it were split up into 
pieces), there may emerge a ‘multinational discount’ as investors see that the MNC 
destroys rather than creates value. From this point of view, one might expect the 
emergence of new organizational forms which avoid these problems together with 
a ‘voice’ strategy from remaining shareholders calling for a more careful 
management of this diversity. Clearly, there are a number of authors (Gereffi 1995; 
Langlois 2003; Powell 2001) currently arguing that economic activities may well 
be being reorganized into network chains of highly specialised actors rather than 
located within hierarchical firms (even of the heterarchical transnational sort!). 
There are also continued debates about how institutional investors should relate to 
their ownership role. We would expect this to continue and as ownership itself 
becomes more international to become more salient.   
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Secondly, within the European Union at least, there are institutional moves that 
affect these processes. One set of moves concerns the development of European 
Works councils, which create a framework within which employees from different 
local sites can learn about their differences without necessarily having to have 
managers act as the conduits and interpreters of diversity and learning (Marginson 
2000). Another set of moves concerns the interest in local embeddedness and local 
regions which the EU is stimulating whereby different sets of actors in local 
contexts gain greater awareness of their interdependence. Both of these enable the 
construction of new narratives of the purpose, position and functioning of MNCs 
and their local sites. One is a narrative of shared interest amongst employees, 
obviously highly attenuated, uneven and confined to limited numbers but 
nevertheless emergent and potentially powerful. The other is a narrative of local 
‘ownership’ and development of economic resources, providing a framework 
outside any particular structure of MNC ownership as a potential safety net for 
local sites (see also the links made between MNCs and EU policies in Kristensen 
and Zeitlin 2005).  
Thirdly, there is the broader debate amongst political groups and social movements 
concerning the inter-relationship between globalization and local contexts. This is 
creating a greater awareness that globalization enhances the potential for local 
identities to emerge at the same time as it overlays this with elements of common 
frameworks, discourses and practices. Stronger local identities will lead to 
increased pressure on MNC managers to take serious stock of their local sites, 
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what institutional advantages lie there and how they may be utilised in a more 
beneficial way for local populations. Such a system will have to constitute itself as 
a shared authority system built on multilevel negotiations that create mutual 
commitments and joint allocation of resources. 
In order to understand the tensions between these different constitutional orderings, 
we would argue that  scholars of international management and MNCs should  
move their gaze to this broader horizon of theoretical debates and empirical issues. 
How is authority constituted and how does such constitutional ordering taking 
place within different types of multinationals? The following constitute a possible 
set of questions and projects: 
• The governance structure of multinationals from different national 
contexts. How are senior managers selected and where does their authority come 
from? Is it primarily from shareholders on the basis of the manager creating a 
successful career within managerial hierarchies? If so, what sort of careers are 
represented amongst this group? Alternatively are there examples of senior 
managers emerging out of a different set of reputational elements – those deriving 
from long service and skill acquisition at local levels?  If so, are they engaged in 
different processes of experimentation aimed at different forms of constitutionally 
ordering MNCs? 
• How, why and with what frequency are MNCs from different national 
contexts restructured? What happens to local sites and local managers in these 
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processes? Are subsidiaries learning from past experiences and are they able to 
create strategies that secure themselves a place in mutual negotiations over projects 
and resources? 
• What sorts of tactics do employees develop in order to try to create a 
shelter against the frequency of changes initiated by the headquarters? Are they 
able to create a stable type of leadership, initiate negotiations on alternative 
benchmarks that to a higher degree reflect on the sorts of improvements that reflect 
local aspirations? 
• How are the loyalties of managers structured and changed in settings 
where career advancement up the MNC is highly uncertain? Is it basically at the 
level of top-executives and of local managers that a market for executives are 
present or are some sort of markets and professional codes emerging at the middle 
levels? Are such transnational spaces engaged in discussions over problems and 
solutions to the constitutional ordering of transnationals? 
In conclusion, our argument is that ‘international management’ can make a serious 
and important contribution to our understanding if it incorporates a stronger sense 
of the institutional foundations of firms into its approach and investigates how 
constitutional orders are being constructed within multinationals. In our view, 
these internal dynamics within firms will repay much closer attention in order to 
understand how processes of integration and variety interact. On the basis of our 
own and others’ research, we believe that this will reveal a much greater 
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complexity of forces than has previously been expected. This is the ‘transnational’ 
challenge. We are a long way from the ‘transnational solution’. 
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Table 1: Authority in different national systems 
 
 
 Liberal Market economies Coordinated market 
economies 
Dominant 
legitimation of 
individual authority 
Position in hierarchy Possession of reputation and 
skills 
Access to authority 
positions 
Through becoming a ‘manager’ 
with general ‘management’ skills 
Gradual acquisition of  
technical and business 
qualifications and skills in 
particular area 
Career patterns Frequent internal and external 
labour market mobility  
Long term commitment to 
particular firm or occupation; 
limited mobility 
Extent of authority 
sharing within the 
organization 
Low High 
Extent of authority 
sharing outside the 
organization – with 
other firms and 
actors 
Low High 
Learning within the 
organization 
Limited to managerial hierarchy High within and across the 
firm 
Impact of authority 
structures on 
change processes 
Top down: focus on 
reconfigurational change: ability to 
move in and out of business areas 
rapidly 
Focus on incremental change 
and learning 
Impact of authority 
structures on 
characteristic forms 
of innovation 
Reconfigurational change: major 
new innovations achieved either 
through internal R+D departments 
or through industry level 
competence-destroying innovations 
leading to establishment of new 
firms and sectors 
Mainly competence 
enhancing within existing 
model of skills and expertise 
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